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U.S. Bilateral Agreements and the
Protection of Intellectual Property
Rights In Foreign Countries: Effective
for U.S. Intellectual Property Interests or
a Way Out of Addressing the Issue?
I.

Introduction

Intellectual property rights have become a topic of interest in
the international community during the past ten years. Authorized
copyright holders in particular have put pressure on the United

States government and the international community to stop the
infringement of original works. Counterfeiting and piracy rates
have continued to remain high every year, especially in the
technology areas like software and CD-ROMs.'
Recognizing a need to advance national interests by helping to
enforce the protection of U.S. intellectual property rights, the
United States started executing bilateral agreements with many of
its Asia-Pacific allies in the 1990's. In 1993, the U.S. and the
Philippines entered into a bilateral agreement that specifically
addressed the intellectual property rights problems in the
Philippines.2 In the same year, a model comprehensive copyright
protection agreement was afforded to U.S. copyright holders in
Taiwan.3 The U.S. continued to expand protection for its
1. Software and Information Industry Association, SIIA's Report on Global
Software Piracy 1999, 18-19 (1999). The Asia-Pacific region had the highest
percentage of software piracy in world in 1999, with Vietnam at 97% and China at
95%. Id. The average amount lost in revenues to software piracy was $2.9 billion
in 1998. Id. In 2000, Vietnam continued to have the highest percentage at 98%,
with China coming in second at 91%. Id.
2. Understanding Concerning the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual
Property Rights [hereinafter Philippines Bilateral Agreement], Apr. 6, 1993, U.S.Phil., KAV No. 4805.
3. Agreement for the Protection of Copyright Between the American
Institute in Taiwan and the Coordination Council for North American Affairs
[hereinafter Taiwan's Bilateral Agreement], July 16, 1993, AIT-CCNAA, KAV
No. 4021.
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intellectual property license holders in the Asia-Pacific region by
enacting a more complete bilateral agreement with China in 1995.'
While the terms of those agreements differ, the results were the
same: protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights.
Many provisions of the bilateral agreements were never
implemented. The effectiveness of bilateral agreements was called
into question by Senator Max Baucus in 1989; but he did so before
most of the intellectual property rights bilateral agreements had
come into existence!
Currently, it appears that intellectual
property rights bilateral agreements are used by the United States
as tools to implement more comprehensive legislation and to create
more thorough enforcement efforts. For a foreign country that
executes bilateral agreements with the United States, the emphasis
on the bilateral agreement is to help the foreign country's
international and economic standing, not preserve intellectual
property rights.
This comment will explain the background of the
aforementioned bilateral agreements on intellectual property right
protection and examine if the agreements accomplished their
intended goals. This comment will also examine the other side of
those bilateral agreements, where the foreign countries get more
than they bargained for, without putting forth much effort. The
effectiveness of bilateral agreements may be key to protecting U.S.
intellectual property rights and the results should be a good
indicator of how the U.S. should pursue future problems with
foreign countries. Unfortunately, the results do not appear to solve
many of the problems that are faced by U.S. intellectual property
license holders or by the international intellectual property
community.
II.

Bilateral Agreement Backgrounds

A.

U.S. -PhilippinesBilateralAgreement

In 1993, United States Trade Representative Michael Kantor
and the Philippines' Secretary of Trade and Industry Rizalino S.
Navarro entered into an intellectual property rights bilateral
agreement, the Understanding Concerning the Protection and
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights [hereinafter
4. Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property Rights [hereinafter China's
1995 Bilateral Agreement], Feb. 26, 1995, U.S.-P.R.C., 34 I.L.M. 881.
5. Max Baucus, A New Trade Strategy: The Case for BilateralAgreements, 22
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1 (1989).
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"Philippines Bilateral Agreement"].6
While the Philippines
Bilateral Agreement covered traditional aspects of intellectual
property,7 such as copyrights, trademarks, and patents, it did not

follow the current U.S. model that goes further to extend
protection, including the protection of databases and making
circumvention tools illegal.8
1. Copyright Protection Efforts-With specific reference to

copyright protection, the Philippine government agreed to abide by
the provisions in the Paris Convention and the Berne Convention,
which are recognized internationally as the standards for intellectual property.9 The Philippines Bilateral Agreement specifically

included protection for a term of fifty years to sound recordings,
literary works, and computer programs."
There were also
provisions to prohibit the rental of the copyrighted works to the
public and give exclusive rights to the producers of sound
recordings and authors of computer programs."
The inclusion by the Philippine government of the protection
of computer programs and their treatment as a literary work was a
large step for that country."
The Philippines recognized that
neither the government nor the private sector could reproduce or
use software without the correct licensing by the exclusive license

6. Philippines Bilateral Agreement, supra note 2, at 1. As of Jan. 1, 2001, the
U.S. Trade Representative was Charlene Barshefsky. President George W. Bush
nominated Robert Zoellick to become the new U.S. Trade Representative under
his administration, but he was not confirmed at the time that this article was
published.
7.

Id.

8. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (1999). In 1998, Congress passed the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act. Id. This broadened the scope of copyright protection to include
on-line copyright infringement and the use of circumvention tools for software
illegal acts. Id. The circumvention tools, usually referred to as Acrackz" or
Ahackz", are used to circumvent source protection codes and allow the infringer to
copy software without the owner's permission. Id.
9. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883,
as last revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583 [hereinafter Paris
Convention]; Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
Sept. 9, 1886, as last revised at Paris, July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter
Berne Convention].
10. Philippines Bilateral Agreement, supra note 2, at 2. The U.S. recently
amended their copyright terms to protect most sound recordings, literary works,
computer programs, etc ...for a term of seventy years. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
11. Id. This provision applies to all works recognized in the agreement as
having copyright protection so that commercial advantage will not be taken of the
original works. Id.
12

Id.
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holder. 3 The provisions, while more comprehensive than before,
are basically useless without enforcement of the new laws.
2. Enforcement Efforts-The enforcement provisions of the
Philippines Bilateral Agreement focus on the Inter-Agency Oversight Committee on Intellectual Property Rights (Committee). 4
The Committee was formed to coordinate, recommend, enforce,
and implement intellectual property rights initiatives throughout
the Philippines. 5
The Committee chose to have copyright
infringement actions brought in an administrative hearing instead
of a traditional court. 6
The United States, in response, created a Special Task Force
on Piracy and Counterfeiting. 7 The Task Force was implemented
to ensure the prosecution of copyright infringement crimes and
investigate criminal copyright infringement.
Penalties for
infringing activities in the Philippines were to become more strict
and include prison sentences and/or fines. 9
Finally, the Bureau of Customs in the Philippines was to
establish border enforcement of intellectual property rights similar
to the United States' intellectual property rights border enforcement.' The customs officials, according to the Philippines Bilateral
Agreement, would receive help from the United States in technical
assistance and training procedures." Copyright owners would be
permitted to contact Customs officials about potential infringing
materials that may enter or leave the country. The Philippines
Bilateral Agreement is better than no agreement, but not nearly as
comprehensive as the proposed intellectual property rights
agreement with Taiwan.

13. Id.
14. Philippines Bilateral Agreement, supra note 2, at 4-6. The Committee was
to meet on a regular basis and issue operating instructions by Aug. 31, 1993. Id.
15. Id. at 5-6.
16. Id. Copyright infringement actions in the United States are generally
brought in federal courts, not in administrative agencies. Id. Copyright owners
may also bring a cause of action in a state court, providing that there is a state
copyright law. Id.
17. Philippines Bilateral Agreement, supra note 2, at 5-6.
18. Id. at 6.
19. Id. The United States also has penalties consisting of fines. Id. The
minimum fine in 2000 for an infringer in a civil suit was $750 if the conduct was not
willful, or up to $150,000 if the copyright owner proved willfulness. Id. In criminal
proceedings, fines in 2000 could not exceed $2,500. Philippines Bilateral Agreement, supra note 2, at 6.
20. Id. at 6-7.
21. Id. at 7.
22. Philippines Bilateral Agreement, supra note 2, at 7.
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U.S. - People's Republic of China BilateralAgreement

B.

The United States and China have entered into several
bilateral agreements in the past, some dealing with intellectual
property rights." In 1995, a new agreement was signed by U.S.
Trade Representative Kantor with China involving more strict
enforcement of copyrights, helping to create a better economic and
The Agreement Regarding Intellectual
trade relationship.
Property Rights [hereinafter "China's 1995 Bilateral Agreement"]
was more focused on technological products, such as CD-Roms and
software, and enforcement of existing laws to protect intellectual
property rights."
1. General Contents-China's 1995 Bilateral Agreement
contains the same traditional provisions as most of the other
intellectual property rights bilateral agreements.25 The People's
Republic of China was to create a Working Conference on
Intellectual Property Rights that would be comprised of State
Council's Departments of relevant industries, such as science,
technology, economic cooperation, and justice.26 The Conference
would be charged with carrying out policy studies, monitoring the
implementation of the laws, monitoring enforcement efforts
described in the laws, and providing education on intellectual
property rights."
2. Enforcement Efforts-In China's
1995
Bilateral
Agreement, China created a State Council Intellectual Property
Enforcement Action Plan to help the state and provinces enforce
the contents of the agreement.' China created specialized courts to
hear intellectual property cases and implement effective litigation."
The United States and China would also cooperate with each other
in customs seizures and in exchanging information about possible
infringing activities." China pointed out its diligent efforts that
were made in recent years to enforce the earlier bilateral agreements,3 but the U.S. had more results in mind.
23. See Memorandum of Understanding on Intellectual Property Rights, Jan.
17, 1992, U.S.-P.R.C., T.I.A.S. 12036.
24. China's 1995 Bilateral Agreement, supra note 4, at 882.
25. Compare,e.g., Philippines Bilateral Agreement, supra note 2.
26. China's 1995 Bilateral Agreement, supra note 4, at 888.
27.

Id.

28. Id. at 883.
29. Id. at 882.
30. China's 1995 Bilateral Agreement, supra note 4, at 885.
31. Id. at 883. The earlier agreement between the U.S. and China was the
Memorandum of Understanding of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 24.
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Remedies Arnd penalties in China's 1995 Bilateral Agreement
included fines, injunctions to halt the infringement activity, and the
forfeiture of any goods that were used to produce the infringing
materials.32 China did recognize that criminal penalties may be
imposed, but gave no indication about the severity of the
penalties.33
C. CopyrightAgreement with Taiwan

No formal intellectual property rights agreement exists
between the governments of Taiwan and the United States that is
as comprehensive as the one proposed by the American Institute in
Taiwan [hereinafter AIT] and the Coordination Council for North
American Affairs [hereinafter CCNAA]. The two entities have
entered into an agreement to protect the rights of copyright holders
in both countries, known as the Agreement for the Protection of
Copyright Between the American Institute in Taiwan and the
Coordination Council for North American Affairs [hereinafter
"Taiwan's bilateral agreement"].34 While no bilateral agreement todate contains all of the provisions that are suggested by the AITCCNAA alliance,35 the proposals are a path for the future that may
be enforceable in years to come.
1.

Copyright Protection Efforts-In Article 1 of Taiwan's

Bilateral Agreement, the parties agreed to provide and maintain
adequate legislation in their respective countries to maintain rights
of authors and other copyright holders. 6 Article 2 expressed the
definitions of "literary and artistic works" to include books,
pamphlets, computer programs, lectures, oral works, musical works,
choreographic works, sound recordings, movies, videotapes, and
drawings. 7 This Article included the most comprehensive list of
definitions of any bilateral agreement in the region.38

The 1992 Memorandum also noted the Chinese government's advances in the
protection of intellectual property rights. Id. Clearly, these advances were not
substantial enough to satisfy the U.S. Trade Representative. Id.
32. China's 1995 Bilateral Agreement, supra note 4, at 890.
33. Id. at 891. It appeared that the Chinese penalties would have a more
deterrent effect if they mimicked those of the U.S. See discussion, supra note 19.
34. Taiwan's Bilateral Agreement, supra note 3.
35. Compare China's 1995 Bilateral Agreement, supra note 4; Philippines
BilateralAgreement, supra note 2.
36. Taiwan's Bilateral Agreement, supra note 3, at 1.
37. Id. at 2-3.
38. Compare Philippines Bilateral Agreement, supra note 2, at 2; China's 1995
Bilateral Agreement, supra note 4, at 883.
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The remaining Articles stated that both published or
unpublished works would be protected for a term of fifty years after
the death of the author.39 Exclusive rights to translation of works
and specific authorization rights to the copyright owners would also
be granted protection for a period of fifty years.'
2. Comparison of the Original Works CategorizationTaiwan's Bilateral Agreement contains the most comprehensive
definition of original works in any of the bilateral agreements. In
comparison, the Philippine government refused to allow oral
communications transmitting ideas or thoughts to be covered under
the intellectual property rights agreement.4 1 Taiwan's Bilateral
Agreement explicitly gives more rights to the exclusive copyright
holder than do the other bilateral agreements. ' Rights to license
public performances and communications of the copyrighted work
is the most comprehensive, other than U.S. Copyright Law. 3
III. Background of the U.S. Trade Representative's Special 301
Annual Reviews
A. Authority for the United States to Impose Trade Sanctions
Under 19 U.S.C. § 2411, the United States Trade
Representative is given the authority to suspend trade agreement
concessions, negotiate new bilateral agreements, and take
"appropriate and feasible" action to enforce U.S. rights under
bilateral trade agreements." According to U.S. law, commerce
includes acts or policies that deny "adequate and effective
protection of intellectual property rights." 5
Generally, any
international policy that threatens U.S. intellectual property rights
may be met with bilateral agreement negotiations or trade
sanctions. '
39. Taiwan's Bilateral Agreement, supra note 3, at 4.
40. Id. at 5-7.
41. Philippines Bilateral Agreement, supra note 2, at 2.
42. Taiwan's Bilateral Agreement, supra note 3, at 5-8.
43. 17 U.S.C. § 201 (2000).
44. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c) (2000). This section also allows the U.S. Trade
Representative to Arespond" to foreign practices that burden U.S. commerce and
are unreasonable. Id.
45. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3)(B)(i)(II) (2000). The definition of commerce is
very broad and covers a variety of acts, policies, services, and practices that could
burden or restrict U.S. commerce. Id.
46. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c) (2000).
This section gives the U.S. Trade
Representative numerous options in dealing with unreasonable foreign conduct.
Id. She may impose import restrictions, enter into binding agreements, initiate
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Under 19 U.S.C. § 2416, the United States Trade
Representative may monitor the implementation of measures
contained in agreements entered into by foreign countries. 7
Further action, other than monitoring, may be taken if the U.S.
Trade Representative believes that a foreign country is not
satisfactorily implementing the measures contained in the
agreement.48 While the power to take measures beyond simply
monitoring agreements is vested in the Trade Representative, it is
rarely used.
B. Contents of the "Special 301" Annual Reviews
Each year, the U.S. Trade Representative posts a new list of
countries that have not enforced intellectual property rights, have
not enacted laws to protect intellectual property rights, or have
failed to meet the provisions of a bilateral agreement that was
entered into with the United States.4 9 The "Special 301" Annual
Review [hereinafter "Special 301" Report] breaks the countries
down into three different categories of concern: The Priority
Watch List, the Watch List, and the Priority Foreign Country List."
The Watch List generally contains between thirty and forty
countries at one time, while the Priority Watch List usually contains
about seven or eight countries that have allowed rampant
intellectual property violations to occur and have not adequately
enforced intellectual property rights. 1 Few countries are posted as
priority watch countries, but they are clearly the worst offenders of
intellectual property rights.
1. Priority Foreign Country- Countries classified as a
"Priority Foreign Country" are those that have the most egregious
acts being performed and/or have the most adverse policies toward
the United States and its products. 2 These countries fail to enforce
investigations, or suspend duty-free treatment. Id. Former U.S. Trade Repre-

sentative Kantor threatened to impose tariffs on certain import products as a
sanction for the 1994 investigation. Special 301 Investigation into China's IPR
Enforcement Practices, U.S. DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, Jan. 9, 1995, available in 1995
WL 8643464.
47. 19 U.S.C. § 2416 (2000).
48.
49.

Id.
See, e.g., USTR Announces Results of Special 301 Annual Review, at

http://ustr.gov/releases/1999/04/99-41.html

(last modified Apr. 30,1999); USTR

Announces Results of Special 301 Annual Review, at http://ustr.gov/releases/1998

/05/98-44.pdf (last modified May 1, 1998).
50.
51.
52.

Id.
See, e.g., id.
Id. "Priority foreign countries are those countries that (1) have the most
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agreements or make any efforts to stop illegal activities that often
occur. 3 Within thirty days of the country being labeled a "priority
foreign country," the United States Trade Representative is
authorized to initiate an investigation into the country's activities.54
2. Priority Watch List-A country that is cited to the
"Priority Watch List" is one that continues to allow rampant
violations of intellectual property rights.55 More specifically, the
countries have a "lack of adequate and effective intellectual
property protection or market access. 56 There are generally
ongoing negotiations about the intellectual property rights
problems while the country is on the Priority Watch List. 7
3. Watch List Countries-The Watch List was created to
monitor progress of implementation commitments to the U.S. with
respect to intellectual property rights. 8 Once a country has been
placed on the "Watch List" by the USTR, the United States expects
that certain initiatives will be passed in accordance with a bilateral
agreement to protect intellectual property rights.59 The U.S. also
looks to see if efforts were made to pass legislation or intellectual
property rights protection.'
Watch List countries have certain
problems that the U.S. expects them to remedy in a way that
conforms to an agreement or to U.S. standards.61 While this list is

onerous and egregious acts, policies and practices which have the greatest adverse
impact (actual or potential) on the relevant U.S. products; and (2) are not engaged
in good faith negotiations or making significant progress in negotiations to address
these problems." Id.
53. See, e.g., USTR Announces Results of Special301 Review, supra note 49.
54. See 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c); see also U.S. Places Top Priority on China for
Piracy Action, ASIAN POLITICAL NEWS, May 6, 1996, available in 1996 WL

7591639. While the article concentrates on China, the Philippines was also noted
being placed on the Watch List for 1996.
55.

USTR Announces Results of Special 301 Annual Review, http://ustr.

gov/releases/1999/04/99-41.html (last modified Apr. 30, 1999).
56. Id. The "Special 301" Reports are generally released in April of each year.
57. Id.
58.

USTR Announces Two Decisions: Title VII and Special 301, available at

http://ustr.gov/releases/1995/04/95-32 (last modified April 29, 1995).
59.
60.

Id.
Id.

61.

See Catherine Curtiss, Edwin Bullock, & Thomas Newman, U.S.

Government in Tough Stand to Enforce Rights Protection Seen Both Here and

Abroad, 219 N.Y.L.J. 89 (1998).
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not as potentially harmful in the trading world, it still keeps
countries nervous about its status with the United States.62
IV. Why a Bilateral Agreement?
For many countries, bilateral agreements represent good will
gestures toward finding a remedy to a bad situation. In many of the
intellectual property rights bilateral agreements, participant
countries are attempting to use the agreement to remove themselves from the U.S. Trade Representative's "Special 301" Lists and
escape possible trade sanctions. 63 In other scenarios, Asian-Pacific
countries who receive negative press and poor statistics for6
intellectual property enforcement are attempting to "save face."
The best way for these countries to prove that they are reliable and
steady for growth is to show the world that they are flexible and
willing to help address international concerns. What they receive in
return is far greater than the contents of their respective bilateral
agreements.
A. Special 301 Considerations

As a condition of the bilateral agreements, both China and the
Philippines stated explicitly in their bilateral agreements that the
United States must remove both countries from the "Special 301"
Priority Watch List. 65 Although each country escaped from the list
during the year that the agreements were executed, the United
States saw no actual improvement substantial enough to keep those
trade partners off of the lists permanently.66 As a result, the
Philippines and Taiwan returned to one of the "Special 301" lists
and remain on the lists today.67 China, because of its elevated trade
status granted in 2000, remains under the monitoring provisions of
the U.S. Trade Representative. 68
62. Id.
63. See Philippines Bilateral Agreement, supra note 2, at 8; China's 1995
Bilateral Agreement, supra note 4, at 886.
64. Microsoft to Clamp Down on Vietnamese Piracy, COMPUTERGRAM INT'L,
July 16, 1999, available in 1999 WL 21237323.
65. See Philippines Bilateral Agreement, supra note 2, at 8; China's 1995
Bilateral Agreement, supra note 4, at 886.
66. See, e.g., USTR Announces Two Decisions: Title VII and Special 301
[hereinafter 1995 Special301 Report], at http://www.ustr.gov/releases/1995/04/95-32
(last modified April 29, 1995), 1996 Special 301 Report, infra note 72.
67. 2000 Special 301 Report, available at http://www.ustr.gov/pdf/special.pdf.
The Philippines and Taiwan were both cited to the Watch List in the year 2000. Id.
68. See id. Legislation was enacted in 2000 to give China permanent normal
trade status with the United States. The House of Representatives voted 237-197
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1. Reasons for the Philippines to Enter Into a Bilateral
Agreement-After the Philippines Bilateral Agreement was
executed in 1993, the U.S. removed the Philippines from the
Priority Watch List. 69 The U.S. expected that the Philippines would
comply by enacting laws that favored intellectual property rights
protection and enforcement of certain copyright standards.
In 1995, the United States cited the Philippines to the Watch
List to ensure that efforts were being made to implement the
conditions of the Philippines Bilateral Agreement.7" Since then, the
Philippines has remained on the Watch List for its failure to
properly implement the provisions and conditions of the Philippines
Bilateral Agreement.71
In October 1996, the U.S. Trade Representative ordered an
out-of-cycle review on the Philippines to determine if measures
were being taken to enact the proposed intellectual property rights
legislation and how serious the government took the enforcement
efforts." The review did help to speed up the legislation initiative,
but the legislation that finally passed both the Senate and the
House were substantially different versions of anticipated
intellectual property rights legislation.73 The Philippines remained
on the Watch List in 1997 for its failure to publicize infringing
activity and its failure to deter others from copyright infringement.74
In 1998, the Philippines created an Intellectual Property Office
within the Department of Trade and Industry, but that was not
enough to take them off of the Watch List.7 5 The U.S.T.R. found
that the weak enforcement efforts and broad licensing restrictions

for the measure, and the Senate voted 83-15 for the measure.
See
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/politics/DailyNews/PNTR000525.html; Antoaneta
Bezlova, Trade-China: Deal Will Accelerate Economic Reforms, INTER PRESS
SERVICE, Sept. 21, 2000.
69. Philippines Bilateral Agreement, supra note 2, at 8.
70. 1995 Special 301 Report, supra note 66.
71. See, e.g., USTR Announces Results of Special 301 Annual Review
[hereinafter 1998 Special 301 Report], at http://ustr.gov/releases/1998/05/98-44.pdf
(last modified May 1, 1998); 2000 Special 301 Report, supra note 67.
72. "Special 301" on Intellectual Property Rights Fact Sheet [hereinafter 1996
Special 301 Report], at http://ustr.gov/reports/special/factsheets.html (last modified
Apr. 30, 1996).
73. USTR Announces Results of Special 301 Annual Review [hereinafter 1997
Special 301 Report], at http://ustr.gov/releases/1997/04/97-37.pdf (last modified
Apr. 30, 1997).
74. Id.
75. 1998 Special301 Report, supra note 71.
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that were proposed by the government were not in compliance with
the Philippines Bilateral Agreement."
In 1999, the Philippine government continued to have
ambiguous Code provisions and inconsistent enforcement efforts.7
Therefore, the Philippines remained on the Watch List of the U.S.
Trade Representative.
In 2000, the Philippines was again cited to the Watch List for a
variety of reasons." First, the Special 301 Report looked at the
failure of the Philippine government to implement TRIPS Agreement obligations and legislation.'s Second, there were ineffective
enforcement efforts against piracy and high levels of piracy for the
year.8' Third, the Philippines has failed to enact an acceptable or
effective regulatory system to combat piracy or infringement
problems.82 Thus, the Philippines did not meet its obligations under
familiar multilateral agreements or under the USTR's guidelines.
Without satisfying all of the provisions of the Philippines Bilateral
Agreement, the Philippines will most likely continue to remain on
the Watch List and have the possibility of moving onto the Priority
Watch List in future years.
2. Reasons for China to Enter Into a BilateralAgreementThe U.S. Trade Representative has cited China to the "Special 301"
list regularly in recent years. After China's 1995 Bilateral Agreement was signed, the U.S. downgraded China from a Priority
Foreign Country to Watch List status.
Because China was
attempting to relieve some of the intellectual property rights
problem areas, the Representative deemed the Watch List
designation appropriate.'
The ideal intellectual property rights provisions promised by
China would have occurred if China's bilateral agreement would
have been followed. Unfortunately, U.S. Trade Representative
Charlene Barshefsky determined that there were still egregious
violations of intellectual property rights in 1996."5 The "Special

76. Id.
77. USTR Announces Results of Special 301 Annual Review [hereinafter 1999
Special 301 Report], at http://ustr.gov/relases/1999/04/99-41.html (last modified
Apr. 30, 1999).
78. Id.
79. 2000 Special 301 Report, supra note 67.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. 1995 Special 301 Report, supra note 66.
84. Id.
85. 1996 Special 301 Report, supra note 72.

2000]

PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

257

301" Report for 1996 re-established China as a Priority Foreign

Country due to the rampant piracy and failure to implement the
provisions of China's bilateral agreement 6 The U.S. also
threatened to impose trade sanctions and begin an investigation if

implementation did not occur.87
The threats that were given in 1996 were voiced in 1997 when
China was again named a Priority Foreign Country.88 The "Special
301" Report cited that China would be monitored under the 1974
Trade Act and that sanctions could be issued if more efforts were
not made for implementation of China's bilateral agreement.89 It
appeared that China had not done enough to fight software piracy
or trademark counterfeiting.' Even with the continued violations,
sanctions were still not issued.

A different tone was taken in the 1998 "Special 301" Report.
While China was still recognized as a Priority Foreign Country, the

U.S. Trade Representative praised China for their efforts in
reducing the number of intellectual property protected products

that were being exported from the country.9' The U.S. government
admitted for the first time that China had a "functioning system" to
protect intellectual property rights, including a Chinese government
survey that revealed that over 800 people had been imprisoned for

their illegal infringing activities.' While these examples of progress
were applauded, the 1998 "Special 301" Report continued to
include concerns about software piracy, the lack of judicial review
in the trademark field, and major counterfeiting problems.93 The
1999 "Special 301" Report did not shed any new light on the
situation in China. The country remained on the Priority Foreign
Country list and continued to be monitored by the U.S. Trade
Representative.94 While the number of pirated copyright works
dropped and a new copyright protection law was expected to be
passed, nothing new was accomplished in the actual legislation or
enforcement fields with regard to China's bilateral agreement

86.
87.
88.

U.S. Places Top Priorityon Chinafor PiracyAction, supra note 55.
Id.
1997 Special301 Report, supra note 73.

89. Id.
90.

Charles Snyder, China Doing Too Little on Pirates: US, HONGKONG
Oct. 3, 1997, availablein 1997 WL 14154236.
91. 1998 Special301 Report, supra note 71.
92. Id. This survey was conducted by the Chinese government and the U.S.
was unable to verify these numbers due to China's failure to put the surveys in the
public record. Id.
93. Id.
94. 1999 Special 301 Report, supra note 77.
STANDARD,
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implementation. 9 Software piracy continued to be a problem in
1999, posting numbers of grave concern to software companies.'
In September 2000, new legislation passed that granted China
permanent normal trade status with the United States. Under the
law, P.L. 106-286, China receives nondiscriminatory treatment from
the United States in its trade relations. 97 While the new law does
not specify that China must be removed from the "Special 301"
Lists, the U.S. Trade Representative did not place China on any of
the Watch Lists. Instead, China was placed under the monitoring
provisions and continues to promise changes in its approach to
intellectual property rights.9
From 1997 through 1999, China's software piracy rates
dropped slightly, from 96% in 1997, 95% in 1998, to 91% in 1999.'
The amount of revenue lost by the illegal infringement has steadily
declined as well, from approximately $1,200,000 in 1998 to $650,000
in 19 99 . 00 While these numbers look impressive, the revenues
make up about one third of the lost revenues in the entire AsiaPacific region and are not shown in the "Special 301" Reports.' '
3.

Reasons for Taiwan to Enter Into a BilateralAgreement-

Taiwan has also been on and off of the "Special 301" Watch list of
the U.S. Trade Representative.f Taiwan's problems on the Watch
List have been ongoing since 1995, when it was first placed on the
list."°3 Since then, the U.S. Trade Representative has insisted that
Taiwan incur out-of-cycle reviews and has threatened Taiwan with
4
sanctions on trade relations for their lack of enforcement efforts.'
In 1998, U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky
placed Taiwan on the "Special 301" Watch List for failing to
adequately protect U.S. intellectual property rights.
Lack of
cooperation in defending copyright interests in courts and administrative agencies fueled Taiwan's citation, as well as non-effective
practices in reducing the exportation of pirated and counterfeit
95. Id.
96. See Snyder, supra note 90.
97. See P.L. 106-286 (2000).
98. See 2000 Special 301 Report, supranote 67.
99. Software and Information Industry Association, SIIA's Report on Global
Software Piracy2000, 13-14 (2000).

100. Id.
101. Id.
102.

See 1995 Special 301 Report, supra note 66; 1997 Special 301 Report, supra

note 73.
103.

1995 Special 301 Report, supra note 66.
Counterfeit Goods Flow from Taiwan to US, CHINA NEWS, Feb. 25, 1999,
availablein 1999 WL 7539341.
105. 1998 Special 301 Report, supra note 71.

104.
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goods."°6
Taiwan was the United States' second-largest source of
counterfeit goods, falling behind China for first place. °7 Over 250
seizures were made in 1998 of Taiwanese products that violated
intellectual property rights."
To make matters worse, customs
officials seized over $75 billion worth of illegal goods in 1998.'0 An
excellent example of the problem falls in software piracy.
Taiwan has decreased its software piracy rates over the past
three years, but not by substantial numbers. According to the
Software and Information Industry Association, Taiwan lowered its
piracy rate of 63% in 1997 to 54% in 1999. "0 Revenues lost to
companies from these numbers, though, have been unsteady.
In 1996, approximately $117,000 was lost to infringing
software."' In 1998, the number jumped to $141,000."' In 1999, the
amount of lost revenues declined to $123,000."' These numbers
help explain why the U.S. Trade Representative refused to take
Taiwan off of the Watch List and continued to pressure the
government for better intellectual property rights protection.
B. Trade-Related Considerations
1.
The Philippines Considerations.-The Philippine government acknowledged the necessity of having an excellent trade
reputation with respect to the protection and enforcement of
intellectual property rights.' The U.S. private sector was included
in a specific provision to make certain that they had a market
presence in the Philippines pursuant to the agreement."' Another
provision contained wording that the U.S. and Philippine
governments would consult on technological developments that
have an impact on intellectual property rights" 6 Facilitating trade
and innovation was one of the main goals of the Philippines in

106. Gary G. Yerkey, Trade: USTR Cites Taiwan for Possible Sanctions Over
Failure to ProtectIntellectual Property, BNA PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L.
DAILY NEWS, Aug. 13, 1998.
107. Counterfeit Goods Flow from Taiwan to US, supra note 104.
108.

Id.

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
SIIA's Report on Global Software Piracy2000, supra note 99, at 14.
SIIA's Report on Global Software Pricay1999, supra note 1 at 19.
Id.
SIIA's Report on Global Software Piracy2000, supra note 99, at 14.
Philippines Bilateral Agreement, supra note 2, at 1.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 7-8.
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signing the bilateral agreement, obvious in the text of the

Philippines Bilateral Agreement."7
2. China's Considerations-China was granted "Most
Favored Nation" trade status for several years in a row, and
recently received normal trade status with the United States."8 This
has not come without the price of bilateral agreements protecting
U.S. copyright holders. The United States and China have an
esteemed bilateral science and technology cooperation program,
using approximately thirty bilateral agreements to meet their
goals." 9 Although China has entered into many bilateral
agreements with the United States, the enforcement aspect of these
agreements generally goes untouched.

China conceded in China's bilateral agreement that one of the
reasons behind protecting intellectual property rights was to
develop its economy and have joint ventures occur between the
United States private sector and Chinese businesses.1 China also
insisted that different U.S. governmental agencies, such as the
Customs Service and the Patent and Trademark Office, provide
assistance to China in improving enforcement efforts and training. 2
Between the assistance and the exchange of information, the U.S.
hoped that China would be able to quickly and easily open trade
and protect intellectual property rights in one swoop.
3. Taiwan's Considerations-Because Taiwan's agreement
was not made as a bilateral agreement between the actual
governments of the countries, there were no trade considerations in
entering in to the agreement." Assuming that the agreement were
ratified by the U.S. and Taiwan, there would presumably be
provisions for the facilitation of trade that would be added to the
existing agreement.

117. See generally Philippines Bilateral Agreement, supra note 2.
118. U.S. Places Top Priority on China for Piracy Action, supra note 54; P.L.
106-286 (2000).
119. East Asia, The Pacific, and the U.S.: An Economic Partnership,U.S. DEP'T
ST.DISPATCH, Apr. 1, 1989, availablein 1989 WL 2468932.
120. Interview conducted by Lauren Thierry with Greg Mastel, Senior
International Economist, Economic Strategic Institute (Apr. 9, 1999). AChina has
not been diligent of forcing the bilateral agreements it has made with the United
States ...China has been good at making promises, but not so good at keeping
them." Id.
121. China's 1995 Bilateral Agreement, supra note 4, at 883-4.
122 Id. at 885.
123. Taiwan's Bilateral Agreement, supra note 3.
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Insight and Analysis

A. Why Look to the Philippines and Chinafor a Model
On its face, it appears that one of the primary reasons a
country enters into a bilateral agreement with the United States is
to protect some kind of internationally recognized right.
With
regard to intellectual property rights, the bilateral agreements
appear to show a good faith promise by a foreign country to comply
with U.S.-favored standards."5 Naturally, the United States
applauds this recognition of rights. What the U.S. should be
looking at, however, is what the foreign nation gets in return for
this good faith promise.
It is obvious that foreign governments are relying on their
bilateral agreements with the United States to receive special
treatment with respect to the "Special 301" lists. Without the
incentive to be removed from the "Special 301" lists, these
countries do not appear to be interested in implementing more rigid
intellectual property laws or standards. China did not enter into the
more comprehensive 1995 bilateral agreement until the U.S. Trade
Representative commenced an investigation
into China's intel12 6
lectual property right enforcement.
Hong Kong is an example of what can happen when a foreign
country does not enter into a bilateral agreement with the United
States. Hong Kong has continuously been monitored on the
"Special 301" Watch List and has received out of cycle reviews for
their poor intellectual property rights behavior for the past three
years. 127
Taiwan's situation is not much different than Hong Kong's
scenario. Having been on the Watch List in 1995, Taiwan's
Bilateral Agreement did not keep them out of hot water. The
reason that Taiwan did not appear on either the 1997 or 1998
"Special 301" Lists is because the U.S. Trade Representative
herself believed the assurances that the Taiwanese government

124. See generally Philippines Bilateral Agreement, supra note 2; China's 1995
Bilateral Agreement, supra note 3.
125. Id.
126. See generally Special 301 Investigation Into China's IPR Enforcement
Practices, U.S. DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, Jan. 9, 1995, available in 1995 WL 8643464;
China's 1995 Bilateral Agreement, supra note 4.
127. 1997 Special 301 Report, supra note 73; 1998 Special301 Report, supra note
71; 1999 Special 301 Report, supra note 77.
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gave to her."' After seeing that the results never materialized,
Taiwan was again named to the 1999 and 2000 Watch Lists.129
Taiwan has also been the center of negative press with respect
to their intellectual property rights enforcement. Not only has the
U.S. Trade Representative publicly denounced Taiwan for its
failure to eliminate obstacles for enforcement, 3 ' but the U.S.
Customs Service published their findings that Taiwan was the
United States' second-largest source for counterfeit goods in 1998.'
Between the negative press and the "Special 301" results, Taiwan
should look to China and the Philippines to find ways of enacting a
bilateral agreement with the United States that can be used in their
favor.
B. What PhilippinesBilateralAgreement Really Accomplished
It has already been noted that the Philippines wanted to create
more trade with the United States and be removed from the
"Special 301" Priority Watch List,'32 but the undertones of the
agreement suggest much more. What the Philippines got in return
for signing and entering into the bilateral agreement was much
more than a boost for intellectual property rights.
The Philippine government never exactly condoned the use of
counterfeit or pirated software in every government agency, but it
knowingly occurred. 33

Otherwise, there would not have been a

specific provision in the Philippines Bilateral Agreement stating
that the government would comply with the copyright laws and not
use illegal software.'34 After the Philippines agreed in 1993 that the

use of the illegal software would end, it took the country over four
years to implement legislation to do so.' Even the software giant
Microsoft took notice of the problem, donating free software to the
government of the Philippines. 36
The Philippines Bilateral Agreement received attention from
investors as well as politicians. With the promises of holding
128. See Yerkey, supra note 100.
129. 1999 Special 301 Report, supra note 49.
130. Trade: USTR Cites Taiwan for Possible Sanctions Over Failure to Protect
Intellectual Property,supra note 106.
131. Counterfeit Goods Flow from Taiwan to U.S.,supra note 104.
132. See supra page 3 and accompanying notes.
133. Wong, Chin Wah, Philippines: 1997 Brings Peril and Promise for IT,
COMPUTERWORLD PHILIPPINES, Dec. 31, 1997, availableat 1997 WL 9098419.
134. Philippines Bilateral Agreement, supra note 2, at 2.
135. Chin Wah Wong, Philippines: 1997 Brings Peril and Promise for IT,
COMPUTERWORLD PHILIPPINES, Dec. 31, 1997, availablein 1997 WL 9098419.
136. Id.
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software as an original work under the Philippines copyright law,
Apple Computers and Acer, Inc. set up subsidiaries in the
Philippines in 1997.137 The Philippines eventual return to the
"Special 301" Watch List was not a deterrent to businesses or the
government of the Philippines. With multi-national corporations
pouring dollars and jobs into the Philippine economy, the
Philippines managed to boost their economy and reputation in the
information technology field and the intellectual property rights
field. Overall, it appears that the Philippines did more than sign a
promise to protect intellectual property rights with the Philippines
Bilateral Agreement; it created a new hot-spot in its economy.
The U.S., unfortunately, has not received their benefit of the
bargain. While new copyright and licensing legislation did pass in
the Philippines, the U.S. promptly viewed the legislation as
inadequate to conform with the Philippines Bilateral Agreement.138
Enforcement efforts have never risen to the expectations of the
United States, creating yet another reason to keep the Philippines
on the "Special 301" Watch List in 1999 and 2000.139 In other words,
the good faith promise that brought prosperity to certain markets in
the Philippines has done nothing for U.S. copyright holders. As
this comment demonstrates, the Philippines is not the only country
to get the upper hand with the United States in intellectual
property law negotiations.
C. China's 1995 BilateralAgreement Accomplishments
China's designation as a Priority Foreign Country in 1994
could have been detrimental to China's economy and trade
between China and the U.S.'" With an investigation ordered by the
U.S. Trade Representative, China stood to lose their lowest-tariff
status, as well as their trade status as a "Most Favored Nation."'4 1
After entering into China's 1995 Bilateral Agreement, the U.S. was
assured that their intellectual property rights would have more
protection and that foreign trade would remain the same with
China.1 2 China's reasoning, looking at both the "Special 301"

137. Id.
138. See 1998 Special 301 Report, supra at note 71; 1999 Special 301 Report,
supra note 77.
139. 1999 Special 301 Report, supra note 77.
140. See Special 301 Investigation into China'sIPR Enforcement Practices,supra
note 125.
141. See supra note 119.
142. See China's 1995 Bilateral Agreement, supra note 4, at 882-884.
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considerations and the trade concerns, had more weight and won
out by the end of 1999.
After China was re-named as a Priority Foreign Country in
1996, the U.S. did not order an investigation into intellectual
property rights violations or irresponsible enforcement."' Instead,
monitoring was ordered and has continued to-date.1" After noting

in 1997 that software piracy continued to be "a serious problem,"
the U.S. Trade Representative still did not move to impose
sanctions."'
This lack of pressure on the Chinese government allowed
China to take advantage of China's 1995 Bilateral Agreement by
applying for membership into the World Trade Organization
[hereinafter WTO]. 46 Membership in an organization, such as the
WTO, that has major intellectual property rights agreements like
those established at the Berne Convention and the Paris
Convention could encourage China to actually implement the
proposed legislation and enforcement efforts provided for in
China's 1995 Bilateral Agreement.1 47 Unfortunately, this implementation has not occurred and this, in particular, was noted in the
2000 "Special 301" Report.
In another area, it took China four years, just like the
Philippines, to implement a decree making it illegal for governmental entities to use pirated or counterfeit software.' 4 While U.S.
Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky praised the decree, 49
these measures should have been implemented earlier to be in
compliance with China's 1995 Bilateral Agreement.
China's standing as a trade partner never suffered after China's
1995 Bilateral Agreement was executed; in fact, China's trade
standing has been elevated. China still maintained their trade
status as a "Most Favored Nation" and continued to export millions
of dollars to the U.S. 1999.150 In 2000, China received permanent

143. 1996 Special 301 Report, supra note 73.
144. 1998 Special 301 Report, supra note 71; 2000 Special 301 Report, supra note
67.
145. Mark Felsenthal, Intellectual Property: USTR Launches WTO Proceedings
Against Denmark, Other Over Copyrights, 14 I.T.R. 812 (May 7, 1997).
146. Pittman B. Potter & Michael Oksenberg, A Patchwork of IPR Protections,
CHINA BUSINESS REVIEW, Jan. 1, 1999, availablein 1999 WL 11878207.
147. Berne Convention, supra note 9; Paris Convention, supra note 9.
148. China Issues New Directive to Fight Software Piracy, at http://www.ustr.
gov/releases/1999/04/99-32 (last modified Apr. 7, 1999).
149. Id.
150. Special 301 Investigation Into China's IPR Enforcement Practices, supra
note 125.
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normal trade status."' While China incurred an investigation for
possible trade sanctions for intellectual property rights violations,
and banned many U.S. imports of fruit and agricultural products
after being placed on the Priority Foreign Country List in 1997.152

Never thinking to address this aspect in China's 1995 Bilateral
Agreement, the U.S. conceded that the unfair trade balance was
not a tool to use in bilateral agreements.
D. The Future of Effective BilateralAgreements
In looking at the Philippines and China, it appears that modern

bilateral agreements for the protection of intellectual property
rights are ineffective tools. The United States has received little in
return for the amount of recognition, aid, and business it has
poured into these countries. In order to make the bilateral
agreements more effective, new provisions need to show the true
power of the United States as a world leader, a trade partner, and
an enforcer of copyright laws.
1. How to Deal with the "Special 301" Reports-It would be
easy to say that the U.S. Trade Representative should not bribe a
foreign country into signing a bilateral agreement with the promise
of taking the country off of one of the "Special 301" Lists.

Unfortunately, it would also be presumptuous.
The United States Trade Representative has generally held her
ground in making certain that each country is cited to at least the
Watch List for its failure to implement any promised measures.
What is missing, however, is a provision in each bilateral agreement
that gives the U.S. Trade Representative discretionary authority to
impose certain types of punishment for a country's failure to
implement the provisions in the bilateral agreement.
A perfect example would be a provision that authorizes an outof-cycle review or an investigation within a certain prescribed
period for each country that returns to one of the "Special 301"
Lists the year after their bilateral agreement was enacted. Because
the "Special 301" Lists have been shown to put a country into

economic or political danger,' 3 using a scare tactic like a
discretionary provision may enhance the bilateral agreement's
implementation power.
The discretionary power would be appropriate and legal for
the U.S. Trade Representative to exploit, given the broad
151.
152.
153.

P.L. 106-286 (2000).
See Snyder, supra note 90.
See, e.g., Yerkley, supra note 106.
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discretionary remedies under 17 U.S.C. § 2411(c) (1999). There
would undoubtedly be concern about the foreign country rejecting
the bilateral agreement on this new ground. Fortunately for U.S.
policy, being taken off of the "Special 301" list would probably be a
more handsome offer than the scare of discretionary power to rename the foreign country for non-compliance. Looking at this as a
balancing test, the immediate removal in the present would almost
always win over predicting the future.
2. How to Deal with the Economic Advantages Given to the
Foreign Countries-The United States, in dealing with intellectual
property rights, includes provisions that force the U.S. into training
and sharing technological advances with each foreign country with
whom we execute a bilateral agreement." This idea is a catch for
the foreign country, but is not balanced for the U.S. by an action
from the foreign country. These training and technology provisions
would be much more effective if they were conditioned upon a
certain amount of implementation by the foreign country.
It would not be unconscionable or even threatening for the
United States to repeat assurances that the U.S. would provide the
technological and training assistance so long as the foreign country
promised to punctually implement something in return. For
example, at least one piece of copyright legislation should be passed
within one year or else the U.S. will no longer be under an
obligation to supply training to the foreign governments. Another
example would be that the U.S. could condition the training and
technology help on the lowering of piracy or counterfeit export
rates within two years by the foreign country. Whatever the
condition, the U.S. Trade Representative needs to be more precise
in the wording of the bilateral agreements and more aggressive in
assuring their implementation.
Again, the threat of future action would probably not be more
intimidating than the threat of immediate or eminent action. If the
U.S. Trade Representative decided to launch an investigation into
intellectual property rights violations of a foreign country with high
piracy rates, it would be more beneficial for the foreign country to
take advantage of the bilateral agreement rather than await the
outcome of the investigation. If the foreign country concedes that
there may be problems in their actions and policies at the onset, it
would save the country economic and political embarrassment.
Instead of being found in a "Special 301" Report or investigation to
have inappropriate standards for intellectual property rights, the
154.

China's 1995 Bilateral Agreement, supra note 4, at 885,886.
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country would simply show their willingness to enter into a bilateral
agreement for the protection of intellectual property rights. The
foreign countries are in this trend already, and it has not proven to

be adverse to their interests yet.
VI. Conclusion
It is clear that a promise by a foreign country to enact
legislation or revamp enforcement efforts is not enough to protect

intellectual property rights. I do not blame the Philippines or China
for executing their bilateral agreements. The bilateral agreements
have proven to be successful for their economies and for their
international standing.
The blame needs to be placed on the U.S. Trade
Representative for allowing such broad provisions with few results.
The United States laws give the U.S. Trade Representative an
arsenal for dealing with countries that do not meet their
obligations. Trade sanctions, investigations, or even something as
simple as a press attack could help certain foreign countries
conform to the ideas that they agreed to, in writing, in their
bilateral agreements. Putting pressure on the foreign country to
meet standards that are already established in the international
community is not tyrannic, nor is it a new idea. Without a stated
time line or a more narrow focus in the text of the bilateral

agreements, foreign countries are getting away with intellectual
property rights murder.
Alisa M. Wrase

